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I. INTRODUCTION 
At issue in this appeal is whether Appellant engaged in workplace misconduct in 
connection with her termination from employment such that she is ineligible for 
unemployment benefits under Idaho Law. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of The Case 
DeAnne Muchow was discharged from employment with Varsity Contractors, Inc. 
on June 26, 2012. From that termination she seeks an award of unemployment benefits 
under Idaho Code § 72-1366. Varsity has objected to her receipt of benefits since her 
termination was for cause that falls within the definition of employee misconduct; thus 
rendering her ineligible for benefits. Idaho Code § 72-1366(5). 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Muchow applied for and initially received unemployment benefits following her 
termination. Varsity objected to Muchow's award of benefits on the basis that she was 
terminated for misconduct and was ineligible for benefits under Idaho's Employment 
Security Law. The Department of Labor reversed the initial award finding she committed 
workplace misconduct and was ineligible for benefits. Muchow appealed. 
Following a telephonic hearing, an Appeals Examiner for the Department of Labor 
concluded in an order issued August 29,2012 that Muchow was eligible for benefits. 
Varsity then appealed that order to the Industrial Commission. 
The Industrial Commission issued its Decision and Order on November 20, 2012 
concluding that Muchow engaged in workplace misconduct and held she was ineligible 
for unemployment benefits. Muchow appeals from that Order. 
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C. Statement of Facts 
Deanne Muchow started to work for Varsity on February 2, 2011 as a Human 
Resources Assistant. Transcript, p. 6, II. 3-10. She received a Varsity Employee 
Handbook and executed an Acknowledgement of that handbook as part of her 
employment. Exhibit 8, p. 6. Muchow's direct supervisor was Jennifer Knapp who, in 
turn, was supervised by Shane Campbell, Director of Human Resources. Transcript, p. 5, 
11.17-21, p. 6, ll. 13-14, p. 30,11.1 14. 
Muchow had difficulty maintaining appropriate levels of professional interaction 
with co-workers, particularly with Knapp. Transcript, p. 22,1. 14 - p. 23,1. 4; Exhibit 8, 
pp. 8-9, 11, 16. Muchow received a written warning on March 22,2012 regarding her 
unprofessional workplace behavior. Exhibits 4, p. 4 and 8, p. 7. Under Varsity's 
policies, insubordination is grounds for immediate termination, regardless whether a prior 
warning is given. Exhibit 8, p. 5, <[ 5. 
On June 26,2012, Campbell held a meeting in his office with Muchow and Knapp 
to resolve complaints regarding Muchow's behavior toward co-worker Heather Mihlfeith 
as well as her continuing unprofessional demeanor toward Knapp. Exhibits 4, p. 8 and 8 
pp. 14-15. During that meeting, Muchow raised concerns she had with Knapp and also 
volunteered she had maintained documentation of those concerns. Knapp stated that she 
too had maintained documentation of Muchow's unprofessional conduct. Campbell felt 
it important to understand specifics of the workplace issue and so he requested they each 
bring their documentation to him after a short break so they could resolve the workplace 
disputes. Transcript, p. 10, 1. 3 - p. 11, 1. 1. 
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Muchow, while on company time and in response to a direct request by her Varsity 
manager, went back to her company cubicle, logged back onto her company computer, 
accessed the document stored on company hardware written on her company computer 
(about workplace issues she experienced with co-workers) that she had previously written 
on her company computer while at work and during work hours, and printed the 
document on a company network printer with company paper. See and compare 
Transcript, p. 39, ll. 9, 22 - p. 40, 1. 1 and Exhibit 6, p. 15 of 17 with Exhibit 6, p. 16 of 
17; see also Exhibit 6, pp. 4-10 (diary entries made during regular company business 
hours). 
Campbell, while walking past Muchow's cubicle, asked Muchow if she was ready 
to proceed with her documentation. She replied affirmatively and, after Campbell 
notified Knapp they were ready, Campbell and Muchow walked toward Campbell's 
office. 
On the way, Muchow showed the papers to Campbell from a distance and said 
"Here is the documentation ... Ijust want you to know that I'm not a liar, that I have it, 
and I'm going to shred it." Transcript, p. 11,11.2-8. 
Campbell replied "No, DeAnne, ... don't shred the documents, bring them into my 
office like we discussed ... so I can look at ... your documentation. Jennifer is coming in 
with hers. Bring it in." Transcript, p. 11,11. 8-12. 
Muchow continued past Campbell's office toward the desk of Carol Rudolph, a 
Varsity payroll clerk, where a company shredder was located. Muchow replied to 
Campbell's directive not to shred the document by stating "[a]nd I deleted it off my hard 
drive." Transcript, p. 11, II. 5-14. 
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Rudolph heard Muchow state she had deleted the document off her computer. 
Exhibit 8, p. 10. 
Muchow went to the payroll department shredder and began to put the company 
paper in the company shredder when her manager again stated "[d]o not shred those 
documents." Transcript,p. 11,1.18-p. 12,1. 18. By this time, Knapp was on her way 
to Campbell's office and heard Campbell tell Muchow not to shred the document. 
Transcript, p. 53,1. 25 - p. 54,1. 10. 
Campbell twice directed Muchow not to shred the document. Muchow heard 
Campbell both times. In response to the first, she told Campbell that she had deleted the 
document from her computer. In response to the second, she stood by the Payroll 
Department shredder and shredded the document. 
Apparently, Muchow disregarded Campbell's clear directives because she did not 
want to discuss workplace issues she had with Knapp but simply wanted to wipe the slate 
clean and start over. Transcript, p. 12,11.5-13; p. 26, II. 24-25. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether substantial and competent evidence supports the Industrial Commission's 
finding that Appellant committed misconduct under Idaho Code Section 72-1366(5) 
and is ineligible for unemployment benefits. 
2. Respondent does not seek an award of attorney fees on appeal but reserves the right 
to later seek an award of costs under Idaho Appellate Rule 40. 
IV. COSTS ON APPEAL 
Respondent objects to Appellant's request for costs on appeal in Appellant's 
Opening Brief, p. 4. Such request is premature and improper and costs for the prevailing 
4 
party in this matter should not be considered prior to this Court's ultimate resolution of 
this matter. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
The Idaho Supreme Court's standard of review of decisions by the Industrial 
Commission is well-settled and limited only to a review of questions of law. Huffv. 
Singleton, 143 Idaho 498,500, 148 P.3d 1244, 1246 (2006) (citing IDAHO CaNST. ART. 
V, § 9; Pimley v. Best Values, Inc., 132 Idaho 432, 434, 974 P.2d 78,80 (1999». 
Under this standard, the Court will give deference to and will not disturb factual 
findings by the Industrial Commission as long as those findings are supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. Id. (citing Frank v. Bunker Hill Co., 142 Idaho 126, 
130, 124 P.3d 1002, 1006 (2005». Substantial and competent evidence sufficient to 
support the Commission's findings is "relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might 
accept to support a conclusion." Id. (quoting Jensen v. City of Pocatello, 135 Idaho 406, 
412, 18 P.3d 211,217 (2000». 
Such difference applies even where there exists conflicting evidence in the record 
since the Commission's findings "must be sustained regardless of whether this Court may 
have reached a different conclusion." Id. (quoting Harris v. Electrical Wholesale, 141 
Idaho], 3, 105 P.3d 267,269 (2004». 
Although an appellant may attempt to have this Court review the factual findings, 
this Court will only review questions of law and "will not reweigh the evidence or 
consider the credibility of witnesses." Id. (citing Pimley, 132 Idaho at 435, 974 P.2d at 
81). That is because "it is up to the Commission to weigh the conflicting evidence and 
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determine the credit and the weight to be given the testimony admitted." Adams v. Aspen 
Water, Inc., 150 Idaho 408, 412-13,247 P.3d 635,639-40 (2011) (quoting Henderson v. 
Eclipse Traffic Control & Flagging, Inc., 147 Idaho 628, 631, 213 P.3d 718, 721 (2009)). 
"Furthermore, all facts and inferences are viewed in favor of the prevailing party 
before the Commission." Id. at 150 Idaho at 413,247 P.3d at 640 (citing Higgins v. 
Larry Miller Subaru-Mitsubishi, 145 Idaho 1,4, 175 P.3d 163, 166 (2007». 
Finally, "[t]his Court adheres to the rule that persons acting pro se are held to the 
same standards and rules as those represented by attorneys .... [and w]hen issues 
presented on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, citations to legal authority, 
or argument they will not be considered by this Court." Huff, 143 Idaho at 500, 148 P.3d 
at 1246 (citing Langley v. State, 126 Idaho 781, 784,890 P.2d 732,735 (1995)). 
B. Substantial and Competent Evidence Supports the Decision Reached 
by the Industrial Commission 
In this matter, the Industrial Commission considered all three grounds recognized 
under Idaho law to determine whether Muchow engaged in misconduct to render her 
ineligible for unemployment benefits. The Commission found that Muchow did, in fact, 
engage in misconduct under the "standards-of-behavior" analysis. Decision and Order, 
pp.5-6. 
Muchow does not appear to argue that the Commission applied the wrong test, but 
that the Commission could neither find Varsity communicated its expectations to her nor 
could the Commission find that those expectations were reasonable. On these points, 
Muchow argues the Commission's findings cannot be sustained because "(1) the 
documentation was already in the shredder and (2) the documentation belonged to the 
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claimant and therefore she was free to do with it as she saw fit." Appellant's Opening 
Brief, p. 5. 
i. The Timing of the Directive Not to Shred 
The evidence in the record shows two very different versions of when and how 
many times Campbell told Muchow not to shred the documents. For her part, Muchow 
maintains that she was not told until after she had placed the documents in the shredder 
and the shredding process had started. 
As noted earlier, the record also contains relevant evidence that the Commission 
could have reasonably relied upon to support its conclusion that Campbell twice directed 
Muchow not to shred the documents: (l) before she was at the shredder; and (2) as she 
began to place the paper in the shredder. 
The Commission noted that "[ w ]hile Claimant maintains that she started shredding 
her documentation before Mr. Campbell told her not to do it, both Mr. Campbell and Ms. 
Knapp testified that Mr. Campbell told her not to shred the documents before she even 
got to the shredder." Decision and Order, p. 6. 
Again, according to Campbell, after showing him the papers from a distance, 
Muchow said, "[h]ere is the documentation ... I just want you to know that I'm not a liar, 
that I have it, and I'm going to shred it." Transcript, p. 11,11. 5-8. 
Campbell replied "No, DeAnne, ... don't shred the documents, bring them into my 
office like we discussed ... so I can look at ... your documentation. Jennifer is coming in 
with hers. Bring it in." Muchow replied to Campbell's directive not to shred the 
document by stating "And I deleted it off my hard drive." Transcript, p. 11, 11. 8-14. 
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Carol Rudolph, a payroll clerk, also heard this part of the exchange between 
Campbell and Muchow. Rudolph heard Muchow state that she had deleted the document 
while walking toward the shredder and that Campbell told Muchow not to shred the 
documents as she was placing the document in the shredding machine. Exhibit 8, p. 10. 
Muchow does concede that she could have told Campbell she deleted the document while 
she was walking to the shredder further corroborating Campbell's testimony as well as 
Rudolph's statement. Transcript, p. 41, 11. 15-23. 
Knapp also heard Campbell tell Muchow not to shred the document. Transcript, p. 
53, 1. 25-p. 54, 1. 10. 
The evidence in the record contained in hearing testimony provided by Campbell 
and Knapp is relevant. It is corroborated by Rudolph's statement. And their testimony is 
certainly probative and sufficient to allow a reasonable person to conclude that Campbell 
directed Muchow not to shred the document before she reached the shredder and while 
she was in the beginning stages of shredding the document. 
The Industrial Commission considered all three possible grounds to determine 
whether Muchow engaged in workplace misconduct; concluding that the case was 
resolved under the "Standards of Behavior" test. Decision and Order, pp. 5-6. The 
Commission also applied the appropriate standard to the facts of this case and determined 
that Muchow's conduct did, in fact, constitute misconduct. Substantial and competent 
evidence supports the Commission's finding that Muchow engaged in workplace 
misconduct and is ineligible for unemployment benefits. That finding must be upheld. 
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ii. Muchow Did Not Have a Right to Disregard Campbell's Order 
Throughout the entire incident that led to her termination, Muchow was at work 
and was being paid by Varsity. Varsity management directed her to bring her 
documentation of workplace complaints to a company meeting. And Varsity 
management twice directed her not to shred a document that was needed in connection 
with a company investigation. Varsity had a reasonable expectation, clearly 
communicated to Muchow, that she would not shred the document and would, in fact, 
provide the document as requested, regardless of what the document contained. 
Even though she was on company time and Campbell issued a reasonable, clearly 
communicated order, Muchow states that the document "belonged to her and she was free 
to do with it as she saw fit." Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 5. Varsity disputes 
Muchow's claim of personal ownership of the documentation she shredded. But what is 
completely undisputed and is a matter of record, is that she did not own the shredder and 
was not free to use it to shred anything contrary to a manager's direct order. 
The paper shredder located near Rudolph is the Payroll Department shredder. 
Exhibit 6, p. 15; Transcript, p. 11, 1. 23 - p. 12, 1. 2. Muchow had no right to use the 
shredder; especially where, as here, a Varsity manager directly ordered her, while she 
was on company premises and while being paid by the company, not to shred a document 
in the company-owned shredder. 
Muchow simply did not have the right to shred the document. 
Additionally, all facts and inferences should be drawn in Varsity's favor. In that 
light, Muchow clearly had no right to disregard Campbell's order. After all, Muchow 
used a company computer while at work to record concerns she had with company 
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personnel regarding issues she faced at work. On the day in question, and while being 
paid by the company, she went to her company cubicle and logged onto her company 
computer at the company's direction and pulled up the document from a company-owned 
hard-drive, printed the document using the company network and company printer, and 
printed the document with company paper. See and compare Transcript, p. 39, II. 9, 22-
p. 40, 1. 1 and Exhibit 6, p. 15 of 17 with Exhibit 6, p. 16 of 17. And she was being paid 
by Varsity throughout the entire incident. 
All the facts and inferences must be drawn in Varsity's favor. Certainly, the 
record contains substantial and competent evidence to support the Commission's findings 
that Campbell's direct order to Muchow not to shred the document was reasonable. It's 
decision should be upheld. 
C. Appellant Seeks to Have this Court Improperly Weigh Evidence and 
Make Credibility Determinations 
Muchow asserts a number of arguments that are irrelevant to the Commission's 
decision or that represent her attempt to have this Court improperly weigh evidence and 
make credibility determinations contrary to those reached by the Commission. 
For example, Muchow seeks to have this Court consider evidence of Campbell's 
business trip (Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 7, <J[ 1); the purpose of the June 26, 2012 
meeting (Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 8, <J[ 2); and seeks to have this Court consider the 
facts surrounding her previous warning for misconduct (Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 
14-15, 1[ V). And Muchow attempts to have this Court weigh evidence and find that the 
probative value weighs in her favor. See Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 9-13, 1[ III; and 
pp. 15-17, <J[ VI. 
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Muchow's attempt to have this Court consider irrelevant evidence or weigh 
credibility of evidence is similar to the appeal made by the appellant in Huff v. Singleton, 
who raised numerous arguments attacking the credibility and weight of evidence relied 
upon by the Industrial Commission. But as this Court explained in Huff, this Court will 
simply "not reweigh the evidenced or consider the credibility of witnesses." Huff, 143 
Idaho at 501, 148 P.3d at 1246. Consequently, this Court should follow its reasoning in 
Huff and not consider Muchow numerous arguments that fail to raise legal issues for this 
Court's review. 
D. Appellant Engaged in Workplace Misconduct 
As found by the Commission and as revealed in the Department of Labor's initial 
call interview to obtain Muchow's statement, Cambell expressly directed Muchow to go 
to her desk, obtain the notes and bring them back to his office to resolve a workplace 
Issue. 
During her phone interview, Muchow responded affirmatively to the question: 
"Y ou were told to go and get your notes and bring them back to the meeting. You went 
to your office and got the notes, but you walked right by his office and shredded them? 
Her answer: "Yes." Exhibit 3, p. 2. 
In addition to finding Muchow engaged in misconduct in shredding the document 
contrary to Campbell's direct order, the Commision also found "Claimant received a 
previous warning for disrespectful behavior and should have realized that shredding the 
documentation in direct disregard of her superior's order would result in further 
discipline." Decision and Order, pp. 6-7. 
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The Commission also found that while Muchow may have felt she did not have to 
show the documents to Campbell if she did not want to, under Varsity's policy '''refusing 
to obey or carry out legitimate orders of a team leader or other management personnel, or 
engaging in other acts of gross insubordination' is grounds for immediate dismissal.'" 
Decision and Order, p. 7 (quoting Exhibit 8, pp. 3-5).1 
Varsity had a reasonable expectation, clearly communicated to Muchow, that she 
would bring the requested documentation to Campbell's office. She deliberatel y refused 
to do so and that refusal was employee misconduct sufficient to render her ineligible for 
unemployment benefits. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Substantial and competent evidence supports the Industrial Commission's 
findings that Muchow engaged in workplace misconduct under the standards of behavior 
test. Consequently, the Commission's decision should be affirmed. 
DATED this 26th day of August, 2013. 
VARSITY CONTRACTORS, INC. 
By 
Nathan ,R;Long, .E~q. 
GenerafCounsel 'and Chief Legal Officer 
1 Evidence shows Muchow received the Varsity Employee Handbook upon her hire date but at least 
by March 23, 2013, approximately three months before her termination. See Exhibit 6, p. 6; Exhibit 8, 
p. 6; Transcript, p. 13, II. 23-25; p. 29, I. 12 - p. 30, I. 10. 
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